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Labour is a central category for Arendt because, in the account presented in The 
Human Condition, it is the dominant mode in which the vita activa, the active life, is 
lived in the modern world.1 Arendt takes it to be dominant both empirically and 
normatively: the former insofar as it is the activity the majority of people are for the 
most part occupied with; the latter insofar as other activities are made subordinate to 
it, mattering or counting for less.2 In being shaped above all by the demands of 
labour, and in being oriented by its ends, modern society can rightly be said to be a 
‘labouring’ society, or as Arendt also puts it, a society in the image of the ‘animal 
laborans’. Arendt credits Marx with the insight that the animal laborans would soon 
be all conquering, that the vita activa lived in the mode of labour would swallow up 
all other possibilities of the active life (Arendt, 2002: 279). But of course she 
fundamentally disagreed with Marx’s assessment of this development, and much of 
what she says in chapter three of The Human Condition − the chapter entitled 
‘Labour’ − takes its departure from, and is oriented throughout by, her profound 
dissatisfaction with Marx’s theory. Arendt regarded Marx as the most important 
theorist of labour (HC, 101), so it is not surprising that the concept of labour she 
deploys for the purpose of diagnosing the fate of the vita activa in the modern world 
should emerge by way of a critical engagement with Marx. This is widely recognized 
in the scholarly discussions of Arendt’s account of the nature and significance of 
labour, which typically proceed first by situating Arendt’s theory in relation to 
Marx’s, and then assessing it in terms of the adequacy or otherwise of her 
interpretation and critique of Marx.3 
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 But while Marx is certainly the most prominent theorist of labour Arendt 
considers, his is by no means the only theory on Arendt’s radar, and the baleful 
effects of conflating labour and the distinct category of work (the source of the 
‘fundamental contradiction which runs like a red thread through the whole of Marx’s 
thought’ (HC, 104)) are not, in Arendt’s view, confined to Marx’s theory. Arendt had 
familiarised herself with a variety of theoretical positions while studying the 
collections on the theory and history of labour in Paris in 1952, and it is clear from the 
footnotes to The Human Condition that for the most part she was unimpressed.4 What 
particularly irked her was the contemporary vogue, as she saw it, to idealize labour, to 
read into labour a degree of psychological depth, a source of personal fulfilment, and 
generally a moral or spiritual purport that it does not and cannot possess. Such a 
pseudo-elevation of labour could be found in recent Catholic and Bergsonian 
approaches to labour, Arendt thought, but it was particularly egregious in the so-
called ‘humanisms of labour’. The term ‘humanism of labour’ had been adopted by 
the influential French sociologist and philosopher Georges Friedmann to name an 
alternative to ‘technicist’ approaches to labour that factored out the human presence 
in labour, or if it was factored in, as a potential obstacle to the optimal functioning of 
the production process (Friedmann, 1946, 1950, 1954b). Rather than hand labour to 
the technocrats, Friedmann called for the humanization of labour, a project that would 
entail deep-seated reforms of the way labour was planned and organized. In Arendt’s 
view, this approach to labour was as fundamentally confused as Marx’s, but without 
the redeeming realism of Marx’s understanding of the labour process as the 
‘metabolism between man and nature’.5 Arendt is exasperated by the ‘absurdities of 
all “humanisms of labour”’ and dismisses the very idea of a humanism of labour as ‘a 
contradiction in terms’ (HC 149, n12). Arendt’s approach to labour, as outlined in The 
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Human Condition, is thus, quite precisely and consciously, an anti-humanist one. It is 
situated in opposition to ‘humanist’ theories of labour as much as it is situated in 
opposition to Marx’s theory. Unlike its position in relation to Marx’s theory, however, 
its position in relation to humanist theories has received little scholarly attention.6  
 The purpose of this article is thus to situate Arendt’s account of labour as a 
critical response to humanisms of labour, or put otherwise, to situate it as an anti-
humanism of labour. It is worthwhile doing this for at least three reasons. First, since 
humanist approaches to labour enjoyed broad appeal at the time of Arendt’s 
composition of The Human Condition, they contribute significantly to the intellectual 
context in which Arendt was writing. Viewed historically, Arendt’s reflections on 
labour − which are at the core of her proposal for thinking about the vita activa in the 
modern world − are interventions in a debate about the meaning of labour in which 
the humanism of labour is a major voice. We thus stand to improve our historical 
understanding of Arendt’s theory of labour by examining it alongside the humanist 
one. Second, such an examination might bring into relief aspects of Arendt’s 
conception of labour that otherwise might escape our attention. Just as one would 
miss a lot of what was going on in Arendt’s theory if one lacked familiarity with 
Marx’s theory of labour, so a lack of familiarity with the humanism of labour might 
be obstructing our view of the depiction of labour presented by Arendt. I will suggest 
that there are indeed features of Arendt’s theory that owe their significance to the 
contrast they make with the humanism of labour, a significance that might be missed 
if those features are not contextualised that way. Third, the debate between the 
understanding of labour advanced by Arendt, on the one side, and the humanism of 
labour on the other, is not just of historical interest, or of interest for those seeking a 
better understanding of Arendt. In its fundamentals, the debate is still going on today: 
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it concerns the philosophical and political orientation we should have in regard to the 
seemingly irresistible trend towards the full automation of production and the 
prospect, as it has been put, of ‘the end of work’ (Rifkin, 2000). By reconstructing the 
rival approaches to labour represented by Arendt’s anti-humanism of labour and the 
humanism of labour, we might hope to gain some insight into what is fundamentally 
at stake in this contemporary debate. 
 I will proceed as follows. First I will sketch the main features of the humanism 
of labour, drawing on texts by Georges Friedmann that Arendt herself mentions as 
exemplifying the humanist approach. This provides a perfect foil for Arendt’s theory 
because, in her view, it illustrates the false idealization of labour that in turn has its 
roots in a failure to distinguish labour and work. In the second section I briefly 
rehearse this distinction, with a particular view to showing how it leads to a radically 
different approach to labour than Friedmann’s humanist one. Then in the third section 
I consider briefly the relevance of these two approaches to labour for the 
contemporary debate around labour reform, automation and the end of work. 
 
Georges Friedmann and the humanism of labour 
‘Humanism of labour’ was a banner used by some leading advocates for labour 
reform in mid-twentieth-century Britain, the US and especially France. The 
expression had a broad and a narrow meaning. In its broad meaning, it referred to a 
wide range of social and economic reforms aimed at ameliorating the condition of 
working people. The condition of workers stood to be improved by such things as 
better job security, safer working environments, proper training, holidays, decent 
leisure opportunities and so forth. The humanism of labour, in pursuing such reforms, 
sought to enhance the quality of life of the industrial labourer, and in that general 
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sense to ‘humanize’ it. In its narrow meaning, the humanism of labour referred to 
more specific reforms concerning the activity of labouring itself: the design, 
organization and distribution of tasks the labourer had to perform in the contemporary 
phase of industrial production. Since its beginnings, industrial production had relied 
on methods that fractionated complex tasks into simple performances that could be 
done quickly, repetitively and, with the help of machines, with vast yields. 
Innovations in the first two decades of the twentieth century, most notably the 
introduction of the moving assembly-line and an increasing reliance on automated or 
semi-automated processes, continued this trend. Alongside this, the conditions of 
optimal human performance in the production line became a matter of systematic 
scientific scrutiny. A key breakthrough here was made with the time-motion studies 
conducted by Frederick W. Taylor (Taylor, 1911). The basic presupposition of this 
approach to the design and allocation of tasks to be performed in the course of 
production was that there was ‘one best way’ of doing it, an optimal solution that 
could in principle be established scientifically (in a laboratory) and applied in situ. 
However, this assumption soon came to be questioned as attempts at implementing 
the model met with varying degrees of success. Studies showed that there was a limit 
to the capacity of the labourer to adapt to rationalized (fractionated, mechanized and 
semi-automated) conditions of production, that beyond this threshold rationalization 
became counter-productive. Furthermore, these studies brought to light unanticipated 
physiological and psychological harms of prolonged enforced engagement in this kind 
of activity. What Taylor and the whole scientific paradigm he worked in had failed to 
take account of − so the evidence suggested − was the human element in industrial 
production. It was the shortcomings of this scientistic − or as it was often called then, 
‘technicist’ − approach to industrial labour that prompted calls for a ‘humanism of 
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labour’ (Friedmann, 1955: 32). This would be a humanism of labour in the narrow 
sense distinguished above, namely one concerned above all to humanize the activity 
of labouring; to recognize and affirm the ‘human factor’ even in industrial work.  
 Friedmann himself used the phrase ‘humanism of labour’ in both its broad and 
narrow extension, but it is the latter that interests us here. What he has in mind is at 
once a philosophical orientation to the problems arising from participation in highly 
rationalized (fractionated, mechanized and semi-automated) activity and a set of 
practical solutions to these problems. The basic philosophical orientation at stake can 
be put as follows. It is true that production on the industrial scale we know today 
would have been impossible without the division of complex tasks into their 
component parts, the mechanization of many of those tasks and their reconfiguration 
within a semi-automated production line. Given the salience of the technical division 
of labour for the rationalization of production (increases in efficiency or 
productivity), it can seem as if the human contribution to the production process 
(labouring activity) is itself intelligible from a purely technical point of view. It 
becomes tempting to think, in other words, that the agency of the labourer can be 
broken down into its simple parts and ‘rationally’ reconstructed in fundamentally the 
same way that the tasks to be performed can be. But this is an illusion. There is 
always a whole human being doing the tasks that are set to be done in the course of 
production, however simple, repetitive, quasi-automatic or mediated by machines 
those tasks are. In face of the predominance of the technical point of view when 
thinking about labour, we need to remind ourselves, Friedmann often insists, of the 
unity of the labouring individual. The person who labours in the factory is, after all, 
one and the same as the person who loves, thinks, suffers, has convictions, allegiances 
and so forth; the activity of labour affects body, mind and soul, and thus has 
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ergonomic, psychological and moral dimensions. For better or worse, the whole 
agent, or the whole personality, is drawn into the experience of labour, and this shapes 
the identity of the labourer in complex ways that the various sciences of labour should 
seek to understand.  
 The first step towards a humanism of labour is thus an acknowledgement of 
the human character of the agent of labour, whatever purpose the labour serves and in 
whatever manner the labour tasks are organized. This means that the technical point 
of view on labour can never wholly be separated from the ethical one. Once this step 
is taken a number of consequences follow for thinking about how labour activities 
might better accord at once with technical and ethical norms. That is, the question of 
the practical reform of labour, of how labour qua activity ought to be, presents itself. 
Friedmann proposes the following three axes of reform, which together amount to 
efforts to ‘humanize’ the activity of labour in ways that are consistent with the level 
reached by the technical division of labour.  
 (1) The first axis has to do with the range of capacities to be exercised in the 
labouring activity. As just mentioned, the reforms advanced in Friedmann’s 
humanism of labour are meant to be implementable within the current state of the 
technical division of labour − they should not presuppose a more developed state; 
they are not meant to be utopian − and this places great constraints on what can be 
achieved in this axis. There can be no return, Friedmann accepts, to a norm of 
‘craftsmanship’: this type of activity, though more satisfying as an expression of 
practical human capacities, simply isn’t consistent with industrial and post-industrial 
methods of production, and more specifically with the technical division of labour 
within which most labouring activity now takes place. But that is not to say that there 
is no room for manoeuvre in the way those fractionated activities are designed and 
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allocated, or no aspects of the craftsmanship model that can be retained. Given the 
general simplification of tasks on a production line, there is no need, for example, to 
limit a labourer’s activities to the performance of just one of those tasks. Task or job 
rotation would both widen the range of activities to be performed by the individual 
labourer and give that person a better sense of the production process as a whole. The 
attainment of ‘an over-all, rational view of the complete production process’ would 
also engage − and perhaps even transform − the intellectual capacities of the workers 
(Friedmann, 1954a: 33). It would not make ‘craftsmen’ of them but it would provide 
an approximation to the craftsman’s use of practical reason, and would mitigate some 
of the cognitively levelling consequences of the technical division of labour. Training 
could be given to do more complex tasks, enlarging the scope of activities to be 
performed and capacities to be engaged. Job rotation, job enlargement, and education 
and training are thus examples of how labour can be humanized along this first axis. 
They might seem like modest reforms, but Friedmann suspects they would be enough 
to satisfy demands for more engaging work activity for most workers. Friedmann is 
guided here by empirical studies of levels of boredom and monotony experienced 
during low-skilled assembly line work. He is struck both by the high level of 
tolerance shown by many workers to repetitive labouring activity, and by the variety 
of responses to that kind of activity in terms of susceptibility to experiences of 
boredom and monotony. A humanism of labour must be sensitive to those variations, 
and not assume one model of what it is to humanize work that applies equally to 
everyone.      
 (2) The meaning labouring activity has for the agent isn’t just a matter of the 
range of cognitive or practical capacities the agent is able to exercise. It also depends 
on subjective investments in the activity, the degree to which the agent is able to 
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identify with it. Here too there is much individual variation, but there are also forces at 
play that make identification and subjective investment more or less likely. Most 
important, the attitudes the labourer has towards labouring activity are affected by the 
social relations in which the activity takes place. The quality of the social relations 
the labourer is inescapably entwined in on account of her labouring activity is 
Friedmann’s second axis of reform. These range from the ability merely to engage in 
conversations with co-workers on the assembly line, to opportunities for participation 
in the planning as well as the execution of the productive process, for having a say in 
the way the work is done, receiving recognition for one’s contribution to the 
collective effort, and so forth. Generally speaking, the more opportunities there are for 
the labourers to participate in the organization of the work the more likely they are to 
invest themselves in it and identify with the work. Friedmann emphasizes the need for 
workers to be integrated within the firm or work organization, which he understands 
in terms of an interaction between ‘centripetal’ and ‘centrifugal’ social forces 
(Friedmann, 1955: 318). The latter push the members of the work organization away 
from each other, the former pull them together. A well-integrated work organization 
will be one in which those forces are well-balanced. Friedmann acknowledged that 
such a balance would be very difficult to achieve so long as ‘managers’ and ‘workers’ 
are sharply separated from each other, or where those not in ‘management’ have no 
say in the work activity, as they are in most places of production. Reform in this axis 
− which aims ultimately, as Friedmann puts it, at the transformation of labourers from 
objects of rationalization to subjects of rationalization − is therefore much more 
ambitious (Friedmann, 1955: 291). But he insists it is not a utopian agenda, partly 
because well-integrated workers are more productive and needed for a well-
functioning work organization, and partly because it is broadly consistent with the 
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level reached by the technical division of labour: there is nothing in the technical 
division of labour that entails inequalities and exclusions in the relations between the 
participants, or that forbids the application of moral norms to the organization of the 
activities (Friedmann, 1955: 351-64). A properly conceived humanism of labour is 
able to articulate and prioritise such issues, and stands opposed to technicist 
approaches (paradigmatically, the approach developed by Taylor) that regard them as 
an irrelevance. 
 (3) Friedmann calls the third axis of reform to be taken up by the humanism of 
labour ‘joy in work’. He concedes that, in this dimension, there is a chasm separating 
the possibilities available to the craftsman and those available to the industrial 
labourer. The industrial labourer, doomed to fractionated, repetitive, machine-like 
activity, cannot hope to experience the joy of crafting an object of beauty. But 
industrial labour is not completely without its pleasures. One can still have pride in 
the work one does, and if the social relations both inside and outside the workplace 
are as they should be, one can enjoy recognition from one’s colleagues, bosses, and 
society at large for the contribution one makes through one’s labour. 
 
Arendt’s rival theory of labour  
As we have seen, part of the motivation behind Arendt’s theory of labour is to present 
an alternative to the humanisms of labour enjoying currency at the time, of which 
Friedmann’s was the most prominent. Arendt’s guiding thought here is that the 
humanism of labour is a project premised on a contradiction. It is a synthesis of two 
mutually incompatible ideas: humanism and its verb form ‘humanize’ on the one 
hand, labour on the other. Literally speaking, Arendt insists, the very expression 
humanism of labour is ‘a contradiction in terms’. But Arendt’s objection is not just a 
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semantic one. In her view, loose talk of ‘humanisms of labour’ and attempts to 
‘humanize labour’ betray a fundamental misconception of the nature of labour and the 
possibilities it admits of. There is more at stake in this controversy than a difference 
over definitions, and in defending her own position, Arendt is doing more than merely 
stipulating one set of definitions rather than another. It is the misunderstanding of 
labour in the humanism of labour that Arendt objects to, and that misunderstanding 
would be present even if the humanism of labour went by another, unabsurd name. 
 But misunderstanding of what, exactly? The short answer is, as I began by 
observing, a way of leading the ‘active life’ − the vita activa led in the mode of 
labouring. Yet the activity of labouring is only one aspect of ‘labour’ understood in 
this broad sense, and much of what Arendt has to say about labour does not concern a 
specific type of activity at all. So, for instance, labour is distinguished from work on  
account of features of the thing produced: consumable objects in the former case, 
objects that endure in the latter (HC, 94). This characterization of labour in terms of 
the thing produced is closely related to its characterization in terms of its existential 
purport or conditions of existence: coping with the demands of being a living 
creature, burdened with the tasks of maintaining and reproducing ‘life’, in the case of 
labour; coping with the demands of building and caring for a ‘world’, in the case of 
work (HC, 7). And this in turn is linked to the location of the activity, whatever that 
activity is, which is such a striking and contentious feature of Arendt’s theory: labour 
is confined to the private or quasi-private ‘social’ realm leaving the public realm for 
the ‘speech and action’ proper to politics. (HC, 176ff). Aspects of Arendt’s depiction 
of the animal laborans also barely touch on the kind of activity this human type 
engages in, focusing instead on its preference for consumption and lack of interest in 
goods higher than the service and enjoyment of life.   
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 So there is more to Arendt’s theory of labour, which is at bottom an account of 
the vita activa represented by the animal laborans, than an account of a type of 
activity. Nevertheless, the theory must provide such an account, and the account it 
provides should be superior to the accounts provided by its rivals. This is why it is 
important to contextualize Arendt’s theory in relation to its rivals; taken out of this 
context, the motivation behind the theory goes missing, or is at least less visible. Not 
least amongst these rival theories was the humanist one offered by Friedmann. We 
have just looked at Friedmann’s account of the kind of activity typical of the 
contemporary methods of production, which is to say the kind of activity apt for the 
level reached by the technical division of labour. Now Arendt broadly shares 
Friedmann’s view of what these methods are, but she has a different set of views of 
the consequences of participating in them and the scope available for reform. By 
reconstructing Arendt’s views on these matters, we can bring into focus her account 
of the activity of labour, activity that accords with the contemporary methods of 
production, without getting distracted by all the other things going on in her theory of 
labour. Moreover, this will allow us to see more clearly what is actually going on in 
the dialectic of The Human Condition insofar as the book offers a superior account of 
the nature of labour activity and its prospects than its rivals. I shall use the three axes 
of the reform of labour activity distinguished by Friedmann to order my 
reconstruction.  
 (1) When we look at the range of capacities labouring activity draws upon, 
Arendt’s view takes its departure from an insight she finds in Locke’s use of the 
expression ‘the labour of our body and the work of our hands’ (HC, 79). We noted 
just now that Arendt links the capacity for labour with the condition of life. Labour is 
the capacity for producing things the consumption of which keeps the life process 
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going, and it is in the nature of such things to be perishable, to have short term 
existence and to be in need of continual replenishment. The objects of labour must be 
repeatedly and cyclically produced. These features of the product of labour carry over 
to the kind of activity that produces them. That is to say, the activity itself is cyclical 
and repetitive, and the cyclical and repetitive character of labour becomes accentuated 
the more the productive process and the methods of production develop. Locke, 
writing along with the physiocrats at an early stage in the development of the methods 
of production, could emphasize how, through bodily effort, labour is ‘mixed’ with the 
earth or some natural material (Locke, Two Treatises); a mixing that should be 
distinguished from manipulation of material (by the hands) in the case of ‘work’. The 
insight here is that the labour of the body is ontologically continuous with the natural 
material it mixes with, the mixing done by the labour serves merely to bring out a 
fecundity inhering in the life process itself. Marx, writing at a later stage in the 
development of the techniques of labour, could fill out this insight with his notion of 
‘production itself’ as the ‘metabolism between man and nature’. 
 Adopting this idea, Arendt proposes that the whole production process, labour 
in general, is effectively activity of the body writ large. This means that the capacities 
required for effective participation in the production process are essentially those of 
bodily exertion and attunement with the movements of machines. The industrial 
labourer is effectively an appendage of the machine and has to adapt to purely 
mechanical and cyclical principles of movement. Arendt is guided here by empirical 
studies suggesting that in making this adaptation, industrial labourers come to rely on 
the pre-cognitive, reflex-like responsiveness of the body, which is where the ‘work’ 
of labour should properly be thought to take place (HC, 98 n33 and 145-6, n8). In her 
view, the aptness for mechanization and automation of the labour process reveals its 
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underlying continuity with the life process, such that in participating in the labour 
process effectively the labourer becomes attuned to the rhythms of life itself. Arendt 
takes this to imply that ‘nothing can be mechanized more easily and less artificially 
than the rhythm of the labour process, which in its turn corresponds to the equally 
automatic repetitive rhythm of the life process and its metabolism with nature’ (HC, 
146). The more repetitive the labour, the easier the attunement; though it may be 
helped along by ‘labour songs’ and other tricks observed by industrial psychologists 
and anthropologists of the factory. Such maieutics may be needed because although 
mechanical production is congruent with the life process in its temporal sequencing, 
the sequences and repetitions themselves are much faster than the naturally occurring 
ones. Mechanised production is ‘unnatural’ insofar as it increases the speed of the 
performance cycles and the rate of performance repetitions, but the capacities drawn 
upon in those performances remain tied to the body and the propensities it has for 
coping with the natural condition of life.   
 Once the logic of labour is made explicit in this way, the scope available for 
expanding the capacities that may be exercised in its activity − and so for the reform 
of labour in this respect − must seem very narrow. Considered from the point of view 
of the capacities apt to be exercised, there is no essential difference between the 
activities of the oldest and most recent avatars of the animal laborans: the ancient 
slave and the modern assembly-line worker. Both are constrained and encompassed 
by the exigencies of the ‘metabolism between man and nature’. There is no point 
trying to gloss the ‘human potential’ in such activity, and proposals to humanize it, if 
they are to remain at all realistic, are bound to count for little. If all that is at stake in 
job rotation, for example, is movement from one station of an assembly-line to 
another, this is unlikely to widen the range of capacities exercised, so long as the 
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same basic reflex-like capacity to respond repetitively and with speed is required at 
each station. Just as it would hardly be a source of solace for the slave to be able to 
rotate between digging for coal and lifting it to the surface, so mere alternation 
between tasks in a highly mechanized factory is unlikely to make the modern labourer 
feel more human. Job enlargement through training, so long as that training is 
oriented toward increasing productivity, is also unlikely to be more than an anodyne, 
and the idea that the labourer might be educated into attaining a ‘rational view of the 
complete production process’ projects a capacity onto labourers for which their 
activity is wholly unsuited. Arendt would have seen the latter proposal as a perfect 
illustration of the tendency amongst modern theorists to idealize labour and to project 
onto it possibilities that belong properly to the distinct category of work (in the sense 
of craftsmanship). 
 (2) If humanist proposals for the reform of labour by way of broadening the 
capacities exercised in labouring activity run against the inner logic of labour, in 
Arendt’s view, so does the humanist project of enriching the experience of labour by 
way of transforming the social relations at stake. Arendt is far from denying that 
social relations are at stake in labour activity, it is just that these are not especially 
‘human’ in her view, and never can be so long as the activity remains labour. This is 
because the sociality of labour is essentially a matter of coordination. Labour activity 
that accords with modern methods of production is, as a consequence of the level 
reached by the technical division of labour, isolated and highly atomized, but it must 
still be coordinated within a larger labour collective. It is the coordination of the 
labour of individual bodies that enables the collective body to do more, to have a 
greater ‘labour power’, than the individual members acting severally. In its crudest 
form, where the level reached by the technical division of labour is at its most 
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primitive, the benefits of coordination, in terms of enhanced labour power, can be 
seen in the ‘labour gang’ (HC, 213). And in Arendt’s view, while the productivity of 
the industrial labourer is much higher than that of the member of the labour gang, and 
the coordination of the activities of industrial labourers a much more complex matter, 
the social relation between the labourers of the modern factory and between the 
members of the ancient labour gang is fundamentally the same. In both cases, it is the 
‘metabolism between man and nature’ that is fundamentally at stake, and insofar as 
any properly human relations are intelligible at all in this context, they can be so only 
in the most attenuated sense.  
 In practice, this means that one should be sceptical about the prospects for the 
humanization of labour through reform of the social relations that mediate labour 
activity. As one might expect, Arendt has a dim view of the ‘human relations’ 
movement in industrial psychology, which she sees as raising false hopes about 
fulfilment through work (about which more in a moment) and as a ruse for motivating 
people to work harder (HC, 149 n12). It might be possible to create a marginally more 
positive attitude amongst the workers in a modern factory or work organization 
towards their labour, say by recognizing their contribution or by granting more 
‘status’ to the work role, and this might marginally improve yield. But in its 
fundamentals the ‘integration’ of workers which these positive attitudes are supposed 
to foster is a matter of coordination of labour powers. Given the nature of the activity 
that is actually required in the modern work organization, there is little for those who 
participate in it to have positive attitudes about, little that is worthy of serious 
recognition amongst peers or by the work hierarchy, other than sheer productivity. 
For Arendt, the ‘human relations’ school of industrial psychology and the humanisms 
of labour more generally exaggerate the difference that can be made to the reality of 
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labour by management methods that facilitate the adoption of more positive attitudes 
to their labour amongst the labour force. These include methods that allow for greater 
participation in the management by the labourers, and Arendt shows little interest in 
the various experiments in worker self-management inspired by the ‘human relations’ 
movement.7 On the one hand, the practice of self-management on the part of the 
labour collective still has, as its final end, efficient production, which is no more 
‘human’ or ‘humane’ for it being planned and self-managed by the workers. On the 
other hand, in Arendt’s view there simply isn’t the appetite amongst the vast majority 
of workers for work activity ‘enriched’ in this way. For the most part, Arendt 
believes, participants in the contemporary labour process just do not have an interest 
in managing it for themselves. She cites some recent sociological surveys of attitudes 
to work in support of this view, including one that found that ‘a large majority of 
workers, if asked “why does man work?” answer simply “in order to be able to live” 
or “to make money”’.8 
 (3) The respondents to those surveys, in Arendt’s view, have a much more 
realistic set of expectations about the possibilities of fulfilment through work than the 
humanist theorists of labour do. As we saw, Friedmann himself thought that the 
complete joys of craftsmanship were beyond the reach of the modern industrial 
labourer, and Arendt agrees with this. She also agrees with Friedmann that labour, as 
distinct from craftsmanship (Arendt’s ‘work’), is not without its own satisfactions. 
But she disagrees with him on the sources of these satisfactions. For Arendt, what 
‘joy’ there is to be had from labour has nothing to do with self-esteem, ‘recognition’ 
or a sense of contributing to some larger set of social purposes, as it did for 
Friedmann; but rather has exclusively to do with the cycle of toil, fatigue and 
replenishment characteristic of the life process (HC, 106). The importance of this 
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should not be underestimated, as it is bound up with one of the fundamental 
conditions of human existence: natural life. It is, on account of this connection, the 
source of what Arendt considers to be the only ‘lasting happiness’ available to human 
beings (HC, 108). Enduring happiness, as Arendt describes it, comes not from the 
manifold pleasures of consumption, or for that matter from hard-won individual 
achievements, but from being part of the repetitive cycle of effort, weariness and 
regeneration that characterizes life itself. Conversely, exhaustion that is followed not 
by pleasurable regeneration but by ‘wretchedness’, or at the opposite extreme an 
‘entirely effortless life’ that has nothing to renew itself from, lacks a crucial life good: 
‘the elemental happiness that comes from being alive’ (HC, 108). Labour, being 
fundamentally an activity of the body, occasions a range of joys and sorrows that have 
the content they do solely on account of the body’s immersion in the life process.  
 For Arendt, the main problem facing modern societies as they enter the post-
industrial phase in regard to the rewards of labour is not that of finding a substitute for 
the intrinsic satisfactions of craftsmanship − in Arendt’s view, that is a forlorn hope − 
but of finding an alternative mode of access to the pleasurable cycle of effort, fatigue 
and regeneration. Arendt shared the view of many of her contemporaries, including 
Friedmann, that the mechanization and automation of production has the long term 
effect of taking the toil out of labour and making human labour less necessary. The 
easier labour is to do, and the less of it that is needed for the continuation of life, the 
more distanced humans are in danger of becoming from the cyclical temporality of 
the life process, and the more forgetful they are prone to become about the place of 
labourious activity in the experience of life. The danger is that with the onset of full 
automation, consumption will become split off from the activity of labour altogether, 
leading not only to a further narrowing of the range of activity that makes up the vita 
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activa, but to alienation from the one source of ‘lasting happiness’ available to 
humans on account of their embodiment. This is the society of ‘labourers without 
labour’ of which Arendt speaks with such foreboding (and, it must be said, contempt) 
in the preface to The Human Condition (HC, 5). 
 
Humanism vs anti-humanism of labour today 
My concern up to this point has been to highlight the difference between Friedmann’s 
humanist theory of labour and Arendt’s theory. The difference is not adventitious: the 
humanism of labour, especially as formulated by Friedmann, was a powerful 
intellectual current in the 1950s, and the theory of labour set out by Arendt in The 
Human Condition was meant, in part, to combat it. When viewed as a rival to 
Friedmann’s humanism of labour, certain features of Arendt’s theory stand out which 
might otherwise go unnoticed, or not go noticed in the right way. In particular, 
Arendt’s views about the range of human capacities at stake in labour, the social 
relations that shape it, and the potential for joy or fulfilment from participation in 
contemporary (and foreseeable) methods of production, gain their force, at least in 
part, from the contrast they make with Friedmann’s humanist position on these 
matters. Humanist proposals for the reform of labour along these lines are 
fundamentally misconceived, in Arendt’s view, and it is part of the task of the central 
chapters of The Human Condition to show why. Unless we have that rationale in 
view, we will miss something important that is going on in Arendt’s text.  
 In the space that remains I want to consider the contemporary relevance of 
Arendt’s critique of the humanism of labour and the alternative she presents to it. I 
will confine myself to a brief consideration of how Friedmann’s humanism and 
Arendt’s anti-humanism of labour might provide usefully contrasting orientations for 
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dealing with some of the main problems of labour we find ourselves with today. Of 
course, the problems of labour in the second decade of the twenty-first century can 
hardly be the same as those of the middle decades of twentieth. But it is not 
unreasonable to suppose that the activity of labour is shaped by similar forces, 
generating comparable worries about the quality of work generally available and 
opportunities for self-realization or fulfilment through work, as well as normative 
conflicts about the management of work activity. The prospect of fully automated 
production, which in 1958 Arendt predicted would empty the factories ‘in a few 
decades’ (HC, 4), seems to many observers closer than ever, and arguably lends 
further contemporaneity to Arendt’s critique of humanisms of labour. It is not 
unreasonable, then, to ask for ourselves what is at stake in the debate between the 
humanism and anti-humanism of labour. Let me follow the lead of Friedmann and 
Arendt by distinguishing three sets of issues: the range of human capacities that are 
apt for expression in labour or work activity; the social relations that are apt for 
regulating that activity; and the sense of individual fulfilment (‘happiness’) that can 
reasonably be expected from participation in the activity.9  
 (1) A contemporary humanist of labour in the mould of Friedmann would 
grant that advances in the technical division of labour would doom a great many 
workers to routine, unskilled, unrewarding labour. There is no fundamental difference 
in the work involved in the manufacture of commodities and the provision of services 
in this respect. Technical skills are required for both, but for the majority of workers, 
the range of them diminishes as the division of labour increases. In the long run, the 
hope is that machines will be able to perform all the routine, repetitive, unrewarding 
tasks that now have to be done by humans. But in the meantime, efforts can and 
should be made to ‘humanize’ the activity that workers have to perform. This can be 
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done by designing work tasks in a way that makes them more challenging and 
engaging, such that the worker has to draw on a wider range of technical capacities to 
perform them.  The crucial point here is that, for the humanist of labour, any given 
stage in the technical division of labour is consistent with more or less humane job 
design.10 The technical division of labour does not determine the activities to be 
performed in any given job, nor does it determine the allocation of those activities to 
particular workers. These are matters of moral and political choice. The humanist of 
labour emphasises the moral and political nature of the decisions at stake here and 
makes reform in this dimension a moral and political priority. The anti-humanist of 
labour, by contrast, takes the scope available for moral and political shaping of the 
activity of labour to be negligible. Placed as the worker must be in the logical space of 
production, the worker is structurally subordinate to the demands of technique and 
must sacrifice his or her subjectivity (his or her unique capacities) to those demands. 
The only political choices that matter in this regard are those that relate to presence or 
absence in the technical division of labour. Political decisions can be made to hinder 
the automation of production, to preserve the human presence in it; or to accelerate 
automation, to lessen the amount of time that human beings have to spend in this 
domain, and ideally to remove them from places of production altogether. Reform of 
the activities that workers are required to do within a given stage of the technical 
division of labour is no substitute for advances in the technical division of labour that 
might remove or lessen the need for human activity within it. From the perspective of 
the anti-humanism of labour, the humanism of labour is unduly ‘superstructural’ in its 
critique of the division of labour and insufficiently attentive to the suppression of 
human capacity the activity of labour in principle involves. 
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 Anti-humanists of labour can take this argument further. They can point out 
that, from its beginnings as a reaction to the shortcomings of Taylorist hyper-
rationalization and micro-management, humanism of labour has been pulling in two 
competing directions. On the one hand, there is the humanitarian impulse to eliminate 
degrading conditions of labour; to correct the reduction of the working human being 
to a mere cog in the machine of the productive process. On the other hand, humanism 
of labour is motivated by inefficiencies in the deployment of the human resource in 
previous organizations of production − Taylorism in particular. Anti-humanists of 
labour suspect that the latter motive is the driving or dominant one when it comes to 
the reform of labour. For practical purposes, ‘human relations’ is a management 
construct designating a mere factor in production; it exists in the same logical space 
as the technical division of labour, not as a limiting point or counter-concept to it. 
Humanism of labour, according to its critics, assumes practical significance by 
masking this fact. The techniques of ‘human relations’ management are invariably 
aimed at absorbing the subject of labour into the production process. The more human 
the process can be made to look, the more readily the subject can come to identify 
with it − become successfully ‘integrated’, as Friedmann says. The humanitarian 
impulse thus not only loses out to the drive for efficiency but becomes the latter’s 
accomplice. ‘Human relations’ in this context is properly viewed as just one technique 
of production amongst others, a technique whose effectiveness relies on it seeming to 
be more than it is; namely a set of genuinely social relations. 
 (2) Something similar can be said of contemporary discourse around 
‘recognition’ and ‘respect’ at work. Much of what is sought nowadays by way of the 
reform of work falls under one of these banners.11 Demands for respect at work 
include, minimally, demands not to be subjected to bullying or harassment; to 
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discrimination on the basis of sex, race, class, and disability; to excessive 
surveillance, and so on. More substantively, they include demands on the part of 
workers for a more meaningful voice in the management of the work they do, for 
more autonomy (less external control) in regard to their work activity, and so on. 
Demands for recognition overlap with these, but often focus on due acknowledgement 
of the contribution workers actually make to the work organization through their work 
activity. The worth of this contribution is often not recognized for what it is, but is 
distorted by stereotypes, especially around gender and race. Complaints about 
breakdowns of trust and a decline in levels of civility at work are common and have 
become mobilizing issues for reform. All of these issues concern the quality of the 
social relations that more or less explicitly regulate the activity of working. 
Contemporary heirs to Friedmann’s humanism of labour believe that meaningful 
reform along these lines is both possible and desirable, indeed should be considered a 
moral and political priority.12 Contemporary heirs of Arendt’s anti-humanism of 
labour are more sceptical. They are inclined to see the whole discourse of recognition 
as a ruse for legitimating the subordination of the individual within the work 
collective or corporation. It is either a tool of oppression, diverting workers from the 
true interest in emancipation from labour altogether, or a purveyor of dangerous 
illusions about the possibility of authentic identity, either through work or some other 
means. The contemporary Arendtian anti-humanist of labour might also be wary of 
demands for more autonomy in work, at least insofar as they hark back to old 
discredited ideas of a self-producing sovereign subject. 
 (3) Underneath these more abstract theoretical misgivings, anti-humanism of 
labour is unconvinced − indeed repelled − by the value the humanism of labour 
attaches to modern work. For the humanist of labour, work even in the context of 
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contemporary methods of production can be, and often is, meaningful, which is to say 
a source of happiness and fulfilment (see Veltman, 2016). The meaning may come 
from the activity itself, or it may come indirectly, through the recognition one 
receives for it. Opportunities for meaningful work, and access to the goods provided 
by work, are however very unevenly and unequally distributed, and this makes work a 
pressing sphere of injustice (See Gomberg, 2007). But for the anti-humanist of labour, 
the value of labour has been greatly exaggerated: the activity, for the most part, is of 
no lasting consequence, it leaves little of real value behind, it lacks ultimate purpose, 
and ‘recognition’ is paltry compensation for the ‘toil and trouble’ it brings. It would 
be better to be spared from the curse of labour in the first place. This is the promise of 
automation. Although, like Arendt, one might have misgivings about the fate of the 
vita activa in the wake of fully automated production, the contemporary anti-humanist 
of labour, less attached to any notion of the active life, may not be so disturbed by 
such qualms. 
 
The previous paragraphs offer just the briefest sketch of the terms of debate between a 
contemporary humanism of labour oriented by Friedmann’s understanding of labour, 
and an anti-humanism of labour oriented by Arendt’s understanding. The point was 
not to take sides but to indicate the relevance of the rival conceptions of labour 
presented by Arendt and Friedmann for current philosophical and political discussions 
about the reform of work as we enter a new phase of automated production.13 For all 
the historical distance that separates Arendt, Friedmann and ourselves, we are linked 
by a shared anxiety about the fate of labour, a fate which even by the 1950s was 
considered by most intellectuals to be more in the hands of technicians and robotic 
machines than a soon to be awakened revolutionary proletariat. While my main 
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purpose in this paper has been to show that, amongst other things, The Human 
Condition served historically to address that anxiety, and to address it in a way that 
Arendt considered to be superior to the alternatives proposed by her contemporaries, 
amongst whom the humanists of labour were prominent, the choice between a 
humanism and anti-humanism of labour by no means belongs to the past. It remains 







1 First published in 1958, The Human Condition was re-published by the University 
of Chicago Press in 1998 with an introduction by Margaret Canovan. All references 
below are to the 1998 second edition, hereafter referred to as HC.  
2 In saying that labour is normatively dominant, I do not mean that Arendt herself 
thought that the vita activa ought to be lived in that mode, but that it was a (if not the) 
characteristic feature of modern society to embed that ‘ought’.  
3 See, for example, Parekh (1979), Ring (1989), and Pitkin (1998). Arendt’s theory of 
labour is also sometimes discussed in relation to feminist theories. See, for example, 
Veltman (2010) and the wider ranging discussion in Dietz (1995). 
4 Arendt mentions the importance of her study of ‘the especially rich French 
collections’ on the theory and history of labour in her report to the Guggenheim 
Foundation, sponsor of the project on ‘Totalitarian Elements of Marxism’ from which 
The Human Condition grew, written in January 1953 (see Young-Bruhl, 1982: 277). 
The document can now be be viewed at ‘The Hannah Arendt Papers’ website at the 
Library of Congress. The footnotes I refer to are p. 127 note 75 and p. 149 note 12.  
5 This phrase, used by Marx when describing the ‘labour process’ (Marx, 1976: 283), 
is repeatedly used by Arendt and captures a key element of her own understanding of 
labour. 
6 Zaretsky (1997) comments on the ways in which Arendt’s argumentation in The 
Human Condition was shaped by her studies of labour history and theory in Paris, but 
his focus is on the inadequacies of social democracy as they appeared to Arendt, 
rather than the more specific inadequacies of the humanism of labour. More recently, 
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Simbarsky (2016) has shed light on Arendt’s work by contextualizing it in debates 
around cybernetics that took place in America in the 1950s, though without dealing 
directly with its contribution to the debate around the humanism of labour.  
7 For example, those described in some detail by Friedmann in Industrial Society.  
8 HC, 127-8 n75. Arendt fails to mention that the survey she cites was concerned only 
with attitudes to work amongst West German youth. A sample of 1206 people from 
Hamburg aged 15 to 22 years was used. This meant that the majority of people 
surveyed actually had very little experience of working, and thus were hardly well-
equipped to answer the question ‘why does man work?’ with any insight. See 
Schelsky (1955: appendix, pp. 339-341).  
9 I restrict the discussion here to activity done in ‘employment’, or in the course of 
doing a ‘job’. It is of course one of Arendt’s chief claims that such activity, in the 
modern world, predominantly has the character of ‘labour’ as distinct from ‘work’. I 
take this to be a contestable interpretation of activities performed in the course of 
employment or doing a job, not a stipulation of what such activity involves insofar as 
it is labour. If Arendt were only saying that what one does in one’s job or employment 
is repetitive, mechanical, aimed at consumption etc. insofar as it is labour, but has 
other features insofar as it is work, it might be true, but platitudinously so. At issue is 
the validity of the interpretation, or the usefulness of Arendt’s conceptual schema for 
understanding the activity in question. 
10 For a compelling case for this view, see Murphy (1993). 
11 See for example the eye-opening study of experiences of discontent in British 
workplaces in Fèvre et al (2012). 
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12 Christophe Dejours, like Friedmann a leading figure at the Conservatiore National 
des Arts et Métiers, may be counted as foremost amongst these. See, for example, 
Dejours (2015).  
13 Not that I am neutral on this issue, but I do not have space here to elaborate.  
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